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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the empirical events of capital market liberalization in Russia 
and refers to the procedure of capital market liberalization described in theory as a 
benchmark to assess the magnitude of events shaping the capital market liberalization in 
Russia.  
 The reformers of Russian regime change did not take a gradual approach of 
adjustments toward a successful socioeconomic transition. The state failed to create 
market-supporting institutions and instead rather proceeded with an ambitious program of 
synchronized application of policy changes and the economic liberalization. Lack of 
market-supporting institutions and an underdeveloped legal system in Russia have been 
the key tools through which politically well-connected managers and politicians 
themselves seized the opportunity and established ownership of former state-owned 
enterprises. Russian privatization did not provide efficiency incentives to produce new 
wealth, rather is has redistributed the already existing wealth through dubious methods.  
Clearly, the ultimate goal of capital liberalization in Russia was not to disperse 
ownership of former state-owned enterprises among the people of Russia, but to create a 
powerful support group that would ensure the second mandate of President Yeltsin’s 
administration. The class of newborn ‘oligarchs’ in Russia became the ruling minority 
that was not interested in creating value; rather, they were interested in stealing the value 
that has already existed. Weak and vaguely defined laws as opposed to explicit legal 
foundations and the ability to enforce contracts at proper institutions make an enormous 
difference in development of capital markets. 
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Liberalization of the Capital Market in Russia 
1. Introduction 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the breeze of fresh start, independence, 
expansion, creativity, and most importantly - freedom from the state-controlled market 
operations blew from Western Europe to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and 
Soviet Union. The drive towards economic development and further economic 
integration has fostered liberalization of the financial markets and market-based reforms 
in many Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. Liberalization and 
market - based reforms in the beginning of the 1990’s created new market opportunities. 
These reforms permitted fewer controls on credit, interest rates and gave birth to 
international transactions. The reforms themselves were fostered by the general climate 
favoring privatization, deregulation and reliance on market mechanisms, the gradual 
erosion of the effectiveness of and policy support for capital account regulation, and the 
influence of international financial institutions in promoting greater integration into the 
global economy and more robust domestic financial systems (BIS, 2004).   
Liberalization of economic activity in the words of Edgar L. Feige is: 
“an activity that permits market determined prices to provide the information and 
incentive signals required to allocate factors, products, and assets to their highest valued 
uses, including price linkages that permit integration with the world economy”. (Feidge, 
3)  
 
Liberalization is a precondition for the provision of a smooth transition from 
state-controlled market operations to market economy.  
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Russia has not achieved macroeconomic stabilization during the process of 
transition, which is a consequence of inter-connected causes. Most importantly, Russia 
failed to create a macroeconomic environment with explicit market information signals as 
well as an environment where contracts concerning private property rights are honored. 
This paper will analyze the impacts affecting liberalization of capital market in Russia 
and discuss its discontents. 
 In the example of capital liberalization in Russia, I wish to understand to what 
extent Russian authorities have carried out the reforms concerning liberalization of the 
capital market and to find out which factors have been the most influential in the process 
of determining policies being carried out.  
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2. Liberalization of the Capital Market 
 
The Soviet Union through its centrally planned economy prevented financial 
intermediaries in the country from operating at a level in accordance with their 
technological potential. The capital and banking system in Russia had to evolve from 
‘scratch’, or in other words from what is considered an extreme financial repression 
(Kemme, 2001).  
In the early 1990’s, Russia began with an ambitious plan of capital market 
liberalization. Liberalization reform frees the power of the market to allocate resources 
more efficiently than they were allocated under the command of central authority. 
Liberalization of capital market is a way for an economically developing country to 
interconnect with the global capital market and attract foreign financial resources to 
finance its growth. Liberalization of the capital market in an emerging economy 
stimulates foreign funds because of scarcity of capital in developing countries; therefore 
the cost of capital in emerging markets is high, until the flow of foreign funds lowers it. 
In theory then, increasing investments raise the capital-to-labor ratio; hence we can 
expect an increase in output per worker. On the other hand, capital market liberalization 
puts an emerging country to risk by attracting large foreign investment flows which could 
create unsustainable foundation for further economic growth. In case of speculative 
investments or ‘hot money’ flowing in and out rapidly, the whole financial system could 
collapse if financial infrastructure is not in place, potentially causing damage to the long-
term investor trust and stagnation of economic growth for extended period of time.   
Economically developing countries going through the process of capital market 
liberalization are attractive targets for foreign investors for their high rates, due to the 
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number of specific risks present in a developing country’s investment environment. 
Factors that limit the demand for an emerging country’s capital are: 
o weak enforcement of investor rights; 
o lack of transparency; 
o legal systems that can be manipulated by residents; 
o expropriation risks; 
o political risk; 
o lack of supporting institutions; 
o information asymmetry. 
The empirical evidence indicates that in the long-run, successful capital liberalization 
in a developing country depends on development of the financial infrastructure and 
protection of investors. Two indicators that either increase or decrease investor 
confidence in companies of the emerging economies are the maturity level of corporate 
governance and a sound legal platform (protection of investor rights). Ideally, a 
liberalized capital market then improves the allocation of resources, increases the capital 
productivity, and stimulates economic growth.  
 
Summary 
The existing literature on economically beneficial liberalization of capital markets in 
developing economies indicates that the following must generally occur prior to global 
capital integration:  
o countries on the verge of capital integration with the rest of the world need to 
establish a balanced institutional base; 
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o develop sound financial infrastructure to protect equity markets from rapid 
oscillation; and 
o arrange a legal platform with great attention devoted to protection of investors 
to establish confidence and trust among investors. 
I will analyze the empirical events of capital market liberalization in Russia and refer to 
the described procedure of capital market liberalization in theory as a benchmark to asses 
the magnitude of events shaping the capital market liberalization in Russia.  
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3. The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Years of High Inflation 
3.1 The Collapse of the Soviet Union 
 
The beginning of a historic Russian socioeconomic change is marked by the day 
of President Gorbachev’s resignation as the President of Soviet Union. This day 
symbolizes not only the beginning of economic reforms, but also the birth of new 
democratic institutions and cultural liberalization. 
Well before the collapse of the soviet regime, the idea of privately owned profit-
seeking corporations, not dependent on the government and efficient use of resources by 
internalizing the costs and benefits of production for industrial enterprise shook the 
ground of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. President Gorbachev initiated the 
transition, but not to the extent of economic, political, and cultural change, but rather for 
the betterment of the current system.   
In 1980s, President Gorbachev sensed that his country was losing its status as one 
of the world’s leading countries. He believed that a major reform needed to be 
undertaken that would bring the rebirth of economic activities ultimately leading to social 
change. President Gorbachev wanted to open up the Soviet society to Western economic 
practices and get rid of the Stalinist governmental control and the way he envisioned this 
to happen was through the movement of Perestroika, which literally meant 
‘restructuring’. Some of the goals of Perestroika were the democratization of daily 
political life, industrial modernization, and most importantly liberalization of the 
economy from the hands of government, getting rid of the ‘Petty Tutelage’ from above. 
‘Petty Tutelage’ is a system in which ministries have control over the functioning of 
enterprises with frequent interferences in day-to-day activities (Gregory & Stuart, 1998). 
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The ultimate goal of Perestroika was to create a market based economy where the 
enterprises carried the responsibility of their faith on their own. The Soviet regime 
allowed the enterprises to stay in business through automatic subsidies, which is not the 
protection the enterprises receive in the market economy. 
The modernization of foreign affairs under Perestroika is referred to as a series of 
legislative acts beginning in 1986 that brought the monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade to an end and allowed ministries and enterprises increasingly able to enter directly 
into foreign trade agreements (Gregory & Stuart, 1998). Greater freedom of doing 
business internally was made attainable through the passage of The Law on Private 
Economic Activity in 1986, which allowed individuals to engage in economic activities 
that were heretofore reserved only for the state. Some of the businesses that were deemed 
up until the passage of The Law on Private Activity were taxi services, dry cleaning, 
restaurants, etc (McFaul, 1995).  However, the country did not prove to be ready for such 
rapid changes mainly due to the absence of the legal system, bureaucratic resistance 
(motivated solely by fear and loss of prestige and authority), and uncertainty.  
When the West sensed the weakness – Soviet Union’s indecisiveness and lack of 
confidence in the current political system – it offered a number of economic transition 
models ultimately guiding Russian political and economic transformation towards the 
market economy. In July 1990, the G7 meeting in Houston established a group, with 
Western institutions such as IMF, World Bank, OECD, EBRD, and European Committee 
assigned with the central role to develop and present the Soviet Union with an optimal 
transition model. President Gorbachev rejected the suggested transition models that the 
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West had in mind for the Soviet Union and resigned as the President of the Soviet Union 
in 1991.  
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was still well in charge of the 
economic activities in the country until President Yeltsin banned the CPSU, abolished the 
Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, assumed control of Soviet institutions and 
subordinated them to the authority of the Russian state (McFaul, 1995). President 
Yeltsin’s sudden surge of political power with the Democratic Russia party in 1991 
through the putsch established the beginning of a new era in Russian history.  
 
Yeltsin’s putsch 
On June 17, 1991, it was announced that the signing ceremony of the treaty which 
would create a Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics was scheduled to be on August 20, 
1991. Gorbachev wanted to push for liberalization policies and with respect to the latter, 
he established the Federation Council, consisting of himself and other leaders of the 
fifteen republics of the Soviet Union. The treaty would give more independence and 
control over their local political and economic affairs to the fifteen republics of the Soviet 
Union.  
Sensing that the new treaty would end the great Soviet state, the key Soviet 
leaders feared they would lose power, thus they have established an Emergency 
Committee and immediately began with preparations for a coup. On August 19, the 
Emergency Committee gave orders to arrest Gorbachev, dispatched troops to key 
positions around Moscow, shut down all independent media outposts, banned all non-
Communist political organizations, and proclaimed a state of emergency.  
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However, Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Republic popularly elected two 
months earlier, had denounced the coup as illegal and called for a general strike. His 
actions were televised all across the world, but to the Russian people he has presented 
himself as the last defender of democracy. It was crucial for Yeltsin to receive support 
from the Russian citizens and through a three day ‘battle’ forced the Emergency 
Committee to surrender (Keller, 1991).  
After Gorbachev was released, the people sided with Yeltsin yet again. Yeltsin 
forced Gorbachev to resign from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) right 
after his release. Then Yeltsin also banned the CPSU from Russian territory (Zlotnik, 
2003). 
 
President Yeltsin was not only interested in the economic transition of the Soviet 
Union but also in the popularity of his policies amongst the people of Russia. The latter 
concern prevailed, and there was pressure to act immediately. Therefore Anatoly Chubais 
(advised by the Clinton administration, IMF, and the World Bank’s economists) who was 
put in charge of the State Committee on the Management of State Property (GKI) in 
October 1991, pushed for quick privatization also known as “shock therapy”, with 
primary focus on price liberalization, currency stabilization, control of the budget, and 
finally macroeconomic stabilization (Boycko, Schleifer, Vishny, Fischer, & Sachs, 1993).  
Mr. Chubias’s actions were thus transferred to the economic system instead of the 
political and legislative platforms.  Consequences of preferred short-term over long-term 
policies implemented by President Yeltsin and Mr. Chubias are currently still present in 
the Russian economy with a largely underdeveloped legal structure.  
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Modern Russia has seen incremental changes in the structure of politically 
powerful minorities; the Yeltsin administration favored a small group of opportunists - 
powerful regional leaders. In exchange for accountability and political support, the 
‘oligarchs’ benefited from the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme and got the opportunity to buy 
state-assets for ‘peanuts’ compared to their real value, the unfolding of which I will 
describe in more detail in the following chapter of this paper.   
3.2 The Years of High Inflation 
 
 Russian reformers liberalized prices before the macroeconomic stabilization was 
assured in a sense of clear fiscal and monetary policies being set. The economic policy of 
price liberalization caused the ‘price explosion’, driven by distorted forces of supply and 
demand. The purpose of price liberalization was to bring the market forces towards a 
supply and demand equilibrium, which was something that the economic agents have not 
been exposed to under the centrally planned economic system. The factors that added to 
the pressure of rising inflation were a short supply of consumer goods and increasing 
prices of oil and gas, due to the disequilibrium between the low price of Russian state 
subsidized oil and gas compared to the global market prices of oil and raw materials.    
 The problem of rapid inflation on the verge of the 21th century in Russia presented 
the biggest obstacle towards the beginning of a smooth economic transition. The rate of 
increasing incomes could not follow sharp rises in prices, which consequentially led the 
Russian economy into a deep recession. Application of ‘shock therapy’ policies proved to 
be the wrong strategy to take as the inflation in the country skyrocketed when the price 
liberalization policy was implemented.   
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 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Inflation 161 2506 840 204 128 22 11 85 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Inflation 37 20 19 15 12 12 11 10 
 
Table 1: Inflation, CPI - %, 1991 – 2006 
Source: Russian Central Bank 
 
Summary 
One of the most perplexing questions of a reformer is whether to liberalize the capital 
account before or after undertaking macroeconomic reforms. The reformers of Russian 
regime change did not take a gradual approach of adjustments toward a successful 
socioeconomic transition. The state failed to create market-supporting institutions and 
instead rather proceeded with an ambitious program of synchronized application of 
policy changes and the economic liberalization. In the following chapter, I will analyze 
and describe the impacts of rapid socioeconomic transition on the Russian capital market 
and why the privatization phase of Russian transformation is commonly referred to also 
as the ‘sale of the century’. 
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4. Privatization Years 
4.1 Restructuring and Efficiency 
 
The process of privatization in Russia brought something that was unknown to the 
economic agents under the communist regime – it created private capital. I believe that it 
is very important for us to understand the stages of Russian privatization in order to 
comprehend the development and current situation of the Russian capital market. The 
general idea behind privatization in Russia was to bring an end to inefficient state-owned 
enterprises through the process of capital liberalization and thus the creation of privately 
owned capital. Private capital creation can only be achieved through a proper process of 
restructuring, which brings in new institutions and puts new policies in place that have an 
influence on resource allocation, with no parallel to those in planned Socialist era.    
 
Key institutions involved in Russian privatization process 
 In ‘The Investment Environment in the Russian Federation’ book, the OECD has 
summarized the institutions involved in shaping the ‘privatization policy as well as 
responsibilities for and practical execution of privatization transactions’.  
 
o The Russian Federal Assembly compiles, on an annual basis, a list of shares in 
strategic and non-strategic joint stock companies (JSC) which are to be offered for 
sale and a preliminary list of state entities that are to be incorporated for 
subsequent privatization. 
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o The Russian Government makes decisions on the sale of shares, on the vesting of 
shares in open JSCs in federal property and on exercising the special rights or 
‘golden shares’ with respect to these JSCs. It also defines the procedure for 
appointing/electing government representatives in management bodies of partially 
or wholly-owned JSCs. 
 
o The Russian State Property Ministry makes decisions on the sale of shares, 
exercises the government’s shareholder rights, issues voting instructions for JSC 
meetings, empowers private individuals to represent government interests in JSCs 
and assumes responsibility for the registration of federally-owned shares and 
related filing procedures. 
 
o The Russian Federal Property Fund exercises ownership and other shareholder 
rights relating to shares offered for sale on behalf of the federal government and 
records buyers’ obligations as laid down in share purchase and sale agreements.  
It also issues certificates starting the right to acquire shares of open JSCs and 
monitors the implementation of investment and social conditions of commercial 
tenders. 
 
o Separate industrial ministries and other federal executive authorities propose 
candidates to act as government representatives in JSC management bodies and 
participate in the decision-making process on the transfer, sale, and disposal 
otherwise of federally-owned shares (OECD, 149). 
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Russian public enterprises have been operating inefficiently because of poor 
information that the government received about their efficiency, such as: employing too 
many people, producing goods that were not needed, being located in economically 
inefficient places, and not having upgraded capital stock (Boycko et al., 1993). The 
policy makers wanted to improve the aggregate economic performance of former state – 
owned enterprises through stimulation of self –interest among businessmen and 
motivations of non - insiders (Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova, 1996). Once the process of 
privatization was completed, the final products created would be the profit – seeking 
corporations, privately owned by outside shareholders, and not dependent on the 
government.  
 As I shall describe later on in the paper, the only thing that stood in a way to 
successful restructuring process in Russia was the inability to eliminate the political 
control of capital. It seems that the goals of the Russian restructuring process were only 
‘pro-forma’ goals, designed by and for the politicians to exercise their power in order to 
obtain vast ownership rights in Russian enterprises. Hoff and Stiglitz write that: 
“For instance, in Russia the law has been used by some powerful groups to 
appropriate assets away from others through an abuse of bankruptcy processes. In some 
cases, the law has been used to create entry barriers to maintain monopoly positions”.  
(Hoff, K. & Stiglitz, J., 4) 
 
After the privatization process had been completed, policy makers and owners of equity 
in Russian enterprises were basically the same person. The roots of the ‘Russian problem’ 
- the inability to keep the politicians and ‘well connected’ managers from acquiring great 
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equity stakes in Russian enterprises, go back to the time before the collapse of the Soviet 
regime, when the Soviet institutional arrangements governing private property allowed 
the key players to obtain the rights of ownership in desired enterprises.  
 ‘Peredel’, which stands for the great redistribution of wealth, was a highly corrupt 
process that included many of the politicians from the Russian Congress of People’s 
Deputies, which was the highest state organ next to the Russian Supreme Court. President 
Yeltsin dissolved the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies in 1993 to intervene into the 
corruption disease that has hit the country from the top down. His statement was:  
“In the last few months Russia has been going through a deep crisis of statehood. 
All political institutions and politicians have been involved in a futile and senseless 
struggle aimed at destruction. A direct effect of this is the loss of authority of state power 
as a whole. In these conditions it is impossible to carry out complex reforms”. (McFaul, 
228) 
 
However, at that point it was already too late to intervene in the process of privatization 
(even for the president).  
In 1992, the Russian government had begun Russia’s mass privatization program 
under the direction of the State Property Committee, headed by Anatoly Chubias 
(Gregory & Stuart, 1998) . Just to get a feel of how rapidly the implementation of 
privatization in Russia moved across the country, I should mention that the presidential 
decree in 1992 required immediate privatization of large enterprises with more than 1000 
employees and by mid-1994 approximately 19,000 enterprises were already registered as 
joint stock companies (Gregory & Stuart, 1998). The evolution of privatization in Russia 
has witnessed two large-scale forms of state assets transfer into private property, namely 
the ‘voucher privatization’ and the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme. Academic articles have 
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named them Phase One and Phase Two of the Russian privatization process. Closer 
examination of the privatization stages will help us better understand the magnitude of 
large-scale privatization in the Russian capital markets.  
4.2 Phase One 
 
 Phase One began in 1992 with the presidential Decree on Acceleration of the 
Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises and was followed by the approval of the 
Fundamental Provisions of the Program for the Privatization of the State and Municipal 
Enterprises for 1992 which outlined the procedures to be implemented (OECD, 2001).  
In the beginning stage of Phase One the firms that went in mass privatization were 
divided between firms that were sold for cash by local governments and firms that were 
later sold for vouchers. The mission of the following stage of mass privatization was to 
divide firms into groupings of ‘mandatory privatization’ (firms in light industries such as 
textiles and furniture), firms subject to privatization with permission of the government 
or more precisely the Privatization Ministry (large enterprises, but not in important 
industries), and lastly ‘strategic industries’ that were prohibited to privatize (natural 
resources, defense, space exploration, health, education, etc.). ‘Strategic industries’ were 
always controlled by the government even if part of the equity in these industries was 
owned privately. The final stage of Phase One mass privatization was to ‘corporatize’ 
companies and register them as joint-stock companies partially owned by government 
(government kept approximately a 20% share in all privatized enterprises), adopt a 
corporate charter, and assign a board of directors (Boycko et al., 1993). 
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 Once a firm was ‘corporatized’ the ‘insiders’ (managers and workers) were given 
three privatization options to pick from. Once the privatization plan was selected, it had 
to be submitted to the Privatization Ministry.  
Option One:  
o 25% of initially offered shares, preferred stocks offered to workers for free. The 
Managers were allowed to purchase 5% of all shares at nominal price. In 
addition, workers and managers could buy additional 10% of shares at a 30% 
discount to book value. The rest of the shares (approximately 40% of total 
shares) were to be distributed among the citizens through voucher privatization. 
Option Two: 
o Workers and managers would get 51% of equity, common shares at a nominal 
price of 1.7 times the July 1992 book value of assets. 
Option Three: 
o Managers were allowed to purchase 40% of all shares if they assumed 
responsibility for the business results – the promise of not driving the enterprise 
into bankruptcy (McFaul, 1995). 
Options Two and Three were additional amendments to the initial privatization 
program, which first offered only Option One. The two options were added to the 
selection due to intense lobbying and fear of managers that the ‘outsiders’ would gain 
the majority of shares. However, the presidential administration insisted that the 
voucher privatization was supposed to be in favor of all Russian citizens, not only the 
ones that were employed by the firm. Thus, the most commonly used privatization 
program was still Option One. Options Two and Three ended up being exclusive deals 
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for managers who used old networks and bribed the politicians to get the permission for 
continuance with the procedure of privatization.  
After the ‘corporatization’ of state-owned enterprises was completed, the state 
began with the largest privatization program ever attempted. The Russian State 
Property Committee called this mass privatization the ‘voucher privatization’ since the 
government distributed vouchers among 148 million Russians in order to increase 
public interest in economic development of the country that would ultimately lead to 
social change.  
4.3 Voucher Privatization 
 
Citizens of Russia could get vouchers for a small fee of 25 rubles (5 cents at the   
prevailing exchange rate) at their savings banks and were widely popular. By January 
1993 almost 97% of vouchers had been distributed among 79% of the Russian population 
(Boycko et al., 1993). 
       There were roughly 15.000 medium and large Russian companies privatized 
where the vouchers could buy shares through individual company auctions held in the 
city where it was headquartered or by investment in an investment fund which acquired 
and invested vouchers on behalf of investors. The only companies that the ‘voucher 
investors’ could invest in, were the companies that were included on the Federal Property 
Fund Privatization List. The face value of a voucher was 10.000 rubles ($30 at the 
prevailing exchange rate), which were used as a sole allowable means of payment in 
company auctions as a tool to acquiring company equity in state enterprises that were 
being privatized. The company auction process firstly held a closed share subscription 
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reserved for the employees, which was followed by open public auctions, usually at a 
regional level (OECD, 2001).  
 Vouchers became the most liquid security in Russia and an active secondary 
market developed for vouchers, while they also traded on many Russian exchanges. 
Vouchers expired at the end of 1993 and once the voucher privatization had come to an 
end, the shares could be sold and purchased for money, which later led to market prices 
for shares of companies and set the stage for first Russian stock exchanges.   
 After the voucher privatization was completed in the end of 1993, the results fell 
short of what was expected; 21 million Russians (14% of the population) acquired shares 
in privatized businesses, and another 44 million (30% of the population) invested in 
investment funds. The main reason why there is such a drastic difference between 
publicity (vouchers were distributed among 79% of the Russian population) and reality 
(only 44% of the population owned equity in the newly privatized companies) is because 
the public auctions were hard to reach and under publicized to say the least. Overall, 
shares acquired for vouchers accounted for approximately 20% of the equity in the newly 
privatized companies (Gustafson, 1999).  
 The voucher privatization turned out to be an ‘insider privatization’ instead of the 
envisioned increase in outsider stake in the newly privatized companies. Voucher 
privatization did not redistribute ownership but instead ended up as a tool for a more 
concentrated ownership in the hands of the economically and politically powerful, such 
as Russian mafia, foreigners, insider managers, and politicians. Most powerful and well 
connected managers have been able to acquire great amount of wealth through the 
purchase of vouchers from Russian citizens. The managers acquired great quantities of 
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equity shares in Russia’s most valuable properties and then sold the assets for a large 
profit. Russian ‘Mass Privatization’ has thus created a corporate sector of mixed 
ownership structure with an average company’s equity structure of 65% internal control, 
33% in the hands of external equity holders such as investment funds and banks, and the 
state owning 17% (OECD, 2001). 
 By the end of year 1993, the Russian Federation completed the voucher 
privatization and successfully transferred 40% of state-owned enterprise to 60 million 
Russian citizens. It is clear that the process of privatization failed to break up large 
industries and satisfy demands for social justice. Rather, it proved to be a great ‘give 
away’ of state property to well connected and politically influential Russian personas. 
Michael McFaul describes the failure of voucher privatization in his essay ‘State Power, 
Institutional Change and the Politics of Russian Privatization’ in the following words: 
“The regime’s inability to withstand short-term demands from enterprise directors 
undermines the broader, long-term goal of creating and sustaining a capitalist market 
economy”. (McFaul, 236) The ‘Masterplan’ of voucher privatization was to create a basis 
for institutional ownership that would monitor management but mainly due to weak legal 
frameworks the short-term interests of a few key players in the political and managerial 
circles prevailed and thus postponed the long-term objective of ‘Westernization’ for an 
uncertain period of time.  
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4.4 Phase Two 
 
The voucher privatization phase failed in generating revenue for the state and 
attracting enough outside foreign or domestic investors to restructure the corporate 
governance issues that Russian market system inherited from the socialist Soviet Union. 
Newly established owners of joint stock enterprises did not obtain any new capital 
through Phase One of the Russian privatization. Therefore the only way to keep their 
companies from going bankrupt was to obtain government subsidies or to use soft 
budgeting. Michael McFaul says that: 
“The combination of little or no pressure from outside shareholders for profits and 
no hard budget constraints has been a recipe for inefficient enterprise at the micro level 
and rampant inflation for the economy as a whole” (McFaul, 234). 
 
In spring of 1992, the Russian Central Bank under Viktor Gerashchenko  
“began dispensing massive new lines of credit to ailing enterprises. The bank also 
approved inter-enterprise debt swapping, an indirect form of subsidization among 
enterprises. Along the same lines, the Congress also approved significantly higher 
budgetary allocations for enterprises than those requested by the Yeltsin government. The 
combination of an undisciplined Central Bank and a soft Congress resulted in an 
explosion of state transfers to ailing enterprises. From January to July 1992 inter-
enterprise debt jumped from 37 billion to 3.2 trillion rubles. By the spring of 1993, state 
subsidies were estimated to be 22% of GDP. Meanwhile, only one Russian enterprise has 
declared bankruptcy”. (McFaul, 235) 
 
Phase Two of the privatization program began on July 1, 1994 and was governed 
by the State Privatization Program under the title of ‘On the Fundamental Provisions of 
the State Privatization Program for State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian 
Federation’ (Gregory & Stuart, 1998).  
 Phase Two of Russian privatization was even more exclusive than the voucher 
privatization as far as keeping outsiders away from the dealings. Outsiders did not wish 
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to participate in this phase by purchasing blocks of shares because most of the joint stock 
companies were already run by the insiders. During the years 1995 and 1998, some of the 
most profitable export industries (Yukos, LUKoil, Sufgutneftegas, Novolietsk Iron and 
Steel) were sold off in order to maximize revenues for the state budget (OECD, 2001). 
The policy of the second privatization focused on giving the country’s most valuable 
companies away for a fraction of their real worth to the well connected managers and 
politicians instead of the workers and other Russian citizens such as during Phase One of 
the Russian privatization.  
 According to OECD, the goal of Phase Two in 1995 was to: 
  “sell off the residual state holdings either by free transfer or sale of shares to 
employees in a closed subscription, sale of equity by investment or commercial tenders or 
by auction or sale of remaining shares at interregional or nationwide auctions”. (OECD, 
147)  
 
Most of the remaining shares of highly profitable enterprises were sold on specialized 
auctions, also called the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme. In the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme, the 
selected strategic state properties’ shares were auctioned to a group of major Russian 
banks (Uneximbank, Menatep, Stolichny, Bank Imperial) in return for loans (OECD, 
2001). The auctions were not public; they were carried out behind closed doors and did 
not allow participation of foreign investors. The scheme proved to be highly controversial 
because the shares turned over ‘in trust’ in exchange for ‘loans’, would a year later 
permanently remain in the hands of the trustees (Gregory & Stuart, 1998).  
 The institution in charge of the implementation at municipal and regional level of 
the ‘loans-for-shares’ program was the Federal Property Fund. The scheme was 
‘orchestrated’ by the Russian Central Bank and was a brainchild of Vladimir Potanin, 
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who was the CEO of Uneximbank at the time (OECD, 2001). Vladimir Potanin suggested 
the idea to President Yeltsin which: 
“involved the Russian State depositing in Russian banks significant blocks of 
shares from the stocks of the most valuable Russian SOEs (oil companies and other 
energy and raw materials producers). Banks would consider the stock they held as 
collateral for the loans they offered in order to bail out a serious fiscal deposit. For each 
company involved in this device, an auction was opened and the winning bank got a 
block of shares, remitted the price as a loan to the state, while holding the shares until 
September 1996. If, on this date, the state had not reimbursed the loan, the bank would be 
allowed to sell or definitively keep the shares (and ownership in an oil trust, etc.). Since 
the state obviously was not capable of repaying its debt, banks gained through this 
scheme the ownership of the ‘crown jewels’ of the Russian industry, for a nominal sum, 
insofar as auctions were rigged and not exempt from collusion. All the winning banks 
were owned by a small group of financial oligarchs well-acquainted with the President of 
the Russian Federation. (Mickiewicz, 33-34) 
 
In fact, the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme was designed by Yeltsin administration aiming at 
consolidation of bankers’ support for his reelection campaign in 1996. 
 The investment activity in 1996 in Russia slowed down after the ‘loans-for-
shares’ scheme which was disapproved by  both the World Bank and the Russian general 
public, which showed discomfort with the procedure and became conscious that the 
insider privatization was a fact in Russia. The investors’ concerns revolved around the 
unsolved issues of long-term strategy of corporate governance and legal problems. 
4.5 The Outcome of the Russian Privatization Process 
 
 The initial goal of the Russian privatization process was to sell Russian 
enterprises to outside bidders who would bring in the know-how, new management, 
capital, and build a coalition of stakeholders (Gustafson, 1999).  The trade-off that 
Russian policy makers had to work out was either to bring in the foreign know-how at the 
cost of giving away ownership of companies to outsiders or to sacrifice foreign 
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managerial skills for the controlling stake of companies in the hands of insiders. 
Reluctance to give controlling shares of Russian enterprises to foreigners has 
consequently created privatized industries starved of capital, companies without clear 
long-term business strategy and large ownership stakes of enterprises in the hands of 
insiders. Privatization policies were largely created by the Congress of People’s Deputies 
(CPD) and the actions taken steered the outcomes of privatization to a different path than 
the one envisioned. 
 The CPD was the core of Russian political corruption. It was constituted by 
directors of large enterprises in minority, who lobbied extensively for the Option Two 
(where ‘insiders’ get 51% of common equity during voucher privatization) to be 
implemented instead of the proposed Option One (25% of equity to workers for free, 5% 
of equity to purchase for managers with additional 10% of equity available for workers 
and managers at 30% discount to book value). Option One offered greater opportunity to 
outsiders to gain majority of equity shares in the company and the scenario that Russian 
authorities would potentially avoid if Option One was indeed implemented would be:  
o Clearer employee/owner problems; 
o Cheap credit would not have been provided by the Russian Central Bank and the 
corporations would have began behaving as profit seekers instead of being 
dependent on ‘soft budgeting’; 
o Decisions of power between different branches of government would get 
institutionalized and create a more effective state (McFaul, 1995).  
Yeltsin dissolved the CPD in 1993, but it was already too late. Since Option Two 
was approved, an avalanche of corruption and opportunism of managers had already been 
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unleashed upon the institutionally unstable country. The greatest drawbacks of the 
privatization in Russia are the old-line politicians and bureaucrats, who have not been 
replaced and still continue undermining all reforms, including privatization (Boycko et 
al., 1993). Gustafson in his book, ‘Capitalism Russian – Style’, writes that:  
“The main issue [privatization failure] is insider control. The big winners from the 
privatization program were the former Soviet-era managers. There remain the same 
instincts, habits, and connections, and the same bend in the spine. It is a rare director that 
does not rush off to government, that does not seek connections with high-placed 
officials, that does not beg for subsidized credits, tax breaks, and privileges. Privatization 
taken by itself is simply a new institutional form superimposed on an old structure”. 
(Gustafson, 37) 
 
The Russian privatization process has been a series of events that were 
compressed under pressure of fast and sweeping reforms that would have taken decades 
elsewhere to unfold. The urgency for fast completion of Russian privatization did not 
allow any time for the market-supporting institutions to be created, thus the lack of legal 
codes (such as still unresolved property rights confusion) was the reason why managers 
could seize control of many enterprises without much difficulty.  
 
Summary  
Lack of market-supporting institutions and an underdeveloped legal system in Russia 
have been the key tools through which politically well-connected managers and 
politicians themselves seized ownership of former state-owned enterprises. Russian 
privatization did not provide efficiency incentives to produce new wealth, rather it 
redistributed already existing wealth through dubious methods. Clearly, the ultimate goal 
of capital liberalization in Russia was not to disperse ownership of former state-owned 
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enterprises among the people of Russia, but to create a powerful support group that 
would ensure the second mandate of President Yeltsin’s administration. Also, the 
program has not contributed to fiscal stability by providing the government with a source 
of revenue. In the next chapter, the primal focus of the analysis will be to dissect 
corporate governance of the newly-born enterprises in Russia and find out if it serves as 
an institution that should protect the interests of investors by reassuring that the money 
invested in a public company will be handled with due care by the management of the 
company. 
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5. New Class of Owners in Russia – The Oligarchs 
5.1 Re-Nationalization 
 
 After the second privatization, denoted by the ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme, came to 
an end in 1995, the opportunities for massive private gains come to an end as well. The 
‘loans-for-shares’ scheme was the ‘modus operandi’ in the process of re-nationalization 
and preserved control of the economy in hands of the few in the Kremlin.  
 Accessibility to financial capital is the most important condition for quick 
economic development, most notably so in the emerging markets. In the emerging 
markets, banks are perceived as the most reliable sources of funds due to the poor 
conditions of other financial institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that executives of 
strategic industries constitute the majority of outside directors on the boards of Russian 
banks. Often the enterprises in the Russian strategic industries are major shareholders of a 
bank and have enough votes to place their representatives on the board. Companies in the 
strategic industries, especially oil and gas companies, have significantly more directional 
ties than companies in other industries in Russia. 
 
Company Number of ties Industry 
Gazprom 22 Oil & gas 
Severstal 14 Ferrous metallurgy 
Sibur 13 Chemical & petrochemical 
Lukoil 12 Oil & gas 
Tatneft 12 Oil & gas 
Sibneft 11 Oil & gas 
EES 9 Electro-energy 
UGMK 7 Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Surgutneftegaz 6 Oil & gas 
TNK 6 Oil & gas 
VSMPO 5 Ferrous metallurgy 
Yukos 5 Oil & gas 
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Table 2: Russian companies with the highest number of directional ties in 2001 
 
Source: Mickiewicz, Tomasz; Corporate Governance and Finance in Poland and Russia 
  
Oil and gas generate more than one-half of Russian exports and are thus 
considered major sources of financial capital in Russia; hence these corporations 
maintain the most directional ties. On the other hand, banks are the institutions in the 
Russian corporate network that receive the most directional ties, also the  
“executives of other corporations are rarely invited to boards of Russian banks as 
knowledgeable experts who may provide information useful in making strategic 
decisions. Usually they represent on the board interests of those organizations where they 
occupy executive positions. Often these organizations are major shareholders of a bank 
that have enough votes to put their representatives on the board”. (Mickiewicz, 142)  
 
The emergence of banking crime mentioned above is called ‘pocket banking’, and 
it basically means that banks lend primarily to companies that own them. A significant 
number of start-up companies that are starving for financial capital are unable to obtain 
loans from Russian commercial banks. The ‘fortunate’ start-up companies that do receive 
funds from banks become controlled by ‘oil & gas’ companies and eventually get 
acquired by these companies. ‘Pocket banks’ thus play a critical role in the formation of 
vast enterprises in Russian economy.     
 
Oil, Fuel, and Gas 64.8% 
Metals 13.8% 
Machinery and Equipment 5.8% 
Chemicals 5.6% 
 
Table 3: Principal Exports 2006 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
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Netherlands 12.3% 
Italy 8.6% 
Germany 8.4% 
China 5.4% 
 
Table 4: Main Destinations of Exports 2006 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
 The Russian banking system is a unique case in global economy as its major 
sources of funds are constituted by industrial companies. Exciting Russian financial 
history has contributed to the lack of public trust in the Russian banking system leading 
consequentially to minimal household deposits held by commercial banks. The majority 
(80%) of all household deposits in Russia are held by the state-owned Sberbank which 
guarantees for reimbursement of all deposits in case of economic crisis. I will be more 
specific later on in the paper as far as the banking system goes in Russia, but what we 
need to understand at this point is that banks do not have much discretion in using the 
capital that is provided to them by industrial companies. Industrial companies require the 
right to control and monitor the way their funds are being used.  
 Scarcity of capital in the Russian economy gives power to the enterprises in the 
strategic industries to act as coordination centers in the financial industry as well. It is 
important to note that these enterprises are still owned by the government. Therefore, 
state capital is the dominating source of funds that drives the Russian economy through 
the operations of strategic industries where state kept the dominating share of equity. The 
government ownership share in large Russian enterprises is known as the ‘Golden share’, 
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which is commonly between 100% and 25% of the enterprise ownership stake. Russian 
strategic industries generate a great portion of their revenues through exports and the 
awareness of being in possession of rich natural resource base. These companies then 
engage in rent-seeking resulting in concentrated control of assets, with oligarchic 
structures not interested in competition, freedom of entry and promotion of new 
entrepreneurship (Mickiewicz, 2006).  
 The strategic industries – banks’ cooptation theory, as Russian oligarchs like to 
call it, is more of a top-down approach that does not result in transforming household 
savings into industrial loans in Russia, but rather in the dependency of large industrial 
companies as sources of funds. As far as the impact on Russian economic development 
and ‘Banking cooptation theory’ goes, the results are further capital starvation, crowding-
out from the debt market, and reliance on the internal sources of funds to generate 
investments, which then ultimately leads to lack of ‘de novo’ companies in Russia. The 
Economist reports that:  
“Small businesses, though growing fast, still account for a mere 12% of GDP, as 
against 30-70% in developed market economies. For sustainable long-term growth, these 
businesses need a better climate. This is where reform starts to matter”. (Mastrapa, 
Special Report: Russia Under Putin) 
5.2 Corporate Governance in Russia  
 
 Russian privatization turned out to be an ‘oligarchic-managerial’ model, with the 
majority of firms under control by the insiders (principally managers) while the rest of 
firms are integrated in a number of investment funds, controlled by politicians, tycoons, 
financial oligarchs, bankers, or state. The concentration of ownership in contemporary 
Russia is above average, and so it is considered as a country where monopolies prevail in 
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its industries. Interlocking directorates and outsider – insider alliances have established 
concentrated ownership of companies in Russia and most enduring networks are of a 
political nature (Mickiwicz, 2006). Oligarchs or ‘agents of economic and political 
change’ as they like to be called, are a ‘unique constituency that is both willing and able 
to lobby for development of market institutions, they are also blamed for weakening 
Russian democratic institutions; they are ‘large-scale businessmen who control resources 
sufficiently vast to influence national politics’ (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005).   
“They [the oligarchs] come from different walks of Soviet life, from the 
nomenklatura and sciences, from the shady world of street hustlers and ranks of Soviet 
industrial managers. But what distinguished them was an ability to change. Every one of 
them learnt to manipulate the old system while at the same time making an incredible 
leap out of it into the world”. (Hoffman, 5) 
 
The rise of oligarchs could be broken down into three separate phases from the 
early 1980s to the beginning of the next decade. During that period they exploited the 
opportunities at hand and grabbed as much capital as they could. The first period goes 
back to the early days of Gorbachev’s reform initiatives when state control allowed the 
young entrepreneurial members of the Communist Party to start their own small 
businesses. During the second period the oligarchs began establishing banks through 
which they were handling the cash flows generated by their businesses. During this 
period the oligarchs began to search for political sponsorship and influence within the 
Kremlin in their search for power. The significant development of the second period is 
the highly controversial ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme, through which the politically well-
connected expanded their holdings to include the ownership of natural resource 
companies and media outlets. During the final period the oligarchic expansion has 
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‘maxed out’ and stabilized when Putin was elected President of Russia. The era of Putin 
in the oligarchic rise to power is portrayed by  
‟the first meeting with the leading oligarchs on July 28, 2000, where President 
Putin offered them the following pact. As long as the oligarchs paid taxes and did not use 
their political power (at least not against Putin), Putin would respect their property rights 
and refrain from revisiting privatization. This pact defined the ground rules of oligarchs’ 
interaction with central and regional government for Putin’s first term (2000–2004)”. 
(Guriev & Rachinsky, 146)  
  
The definition of oligarchs as large private owners excludes politicians, 
bureaucrats or executives of public companies even when they de facto control large 
firms’ (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005). Oligarchs’ ownership stakes are particularly high in 
natural resources and automotive industry, they are not present in natural gas, energy or 
manufacture of machinery industries, yet these state conglomerates are horizontally and 
vertically well integrated with enterprises owned by oligarchs.  
 
Senior 
partner(s) 
Holding 
company/firm, 
major sector(s) 
Employment, 
in thousands 
(% of sample) 
Sales, in 
billions of 
rubles (% of 
sample) 
Wealth, in 
billions of 
US$ 
Oleg 
Deripaska 
Base 
Element/RusAl, 
aluminum, auto 
169 (3.9%) 65 (1.3%) 4.5 
Roman 
Abramovich 
Millhouse/Sibneft, 
oil 169 (3.9%) 203 (3.9%) 12.5 
Vladimir 
Kadannikov 
AutoVAZ, 
automotive 167 (3.9%) 112 (2.2%) 0.8 
Sergei Popov, 
Andrei 
Melinichenko, 
Dmitry 
Pumpiansky 
MDM, coal, pipes, 
chemical 143 (3.3%) 70 (1.4%) 2.9 
Vagit 
Alekperov Lukoil, oil 137 (3.2%) 475 (9.2%) 5.6 
Alexiei 
Mordashov Severstal, steel, auto 122 (2.8%) 78 (1.5%) 4.5 
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Vladimir 
Potanin, 
Mikhail 
Prokhorov 
Interros/Norilsk 
Nikel, nonferrous 
metals 
112 (2.6%) 137 (2.6%) 10.8 
Alexandr 
Abramov Evrazholding. steel 101 (2.3%) 52 (1.0%) 2.4 
Len Blavatnik, 
Victor 
Vekselberg 
Access-
Renova/TNK-BP, 
oil, aluminum 
94 (2.2%) 121 (2.3%) 9.4 
Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky Menatep/Yukos, oil 93 (2.2%) 149 (2.9%) 24.4 
Iskander 
Makhmudov 
UGMK, nonferrous 
metals 75 (1.7%) 33 (0.6%) 2.1 
Vladimir 
Bogdanov Surgutneftegaz, oil 65 (1.5%) 163 (3.1%) 2.2 
Victor 
Rashnikov 
Magnitogorsk Steel, 
steel 57 (1.3%) 57 (1.1%) 1.3 
Igor Zyuzin Mechel, steel, coal 54 (1.3%) 31 (0.6%) 1.1 
Vladimir Lisin Novolipetsk Steel, 
steel 47 (1.1%) 39 (0.8%) 4.8 
Zakhar 
Smushkin, 
Boris 
Zigarevich, 
Mikhail 
Zigarevich 
IlimPulpEnterprises, 
pulp 42 (1.0%) 20 (0.4%) 1 
Shafgat 
Tahaudinov Tatnaeft, oil 41 (1.0%) 41 (0.8%) 2.9 
Mikhail 
Fridman Alfa/TNK-BP, oil 38 (0.9%) 107 (2.1%) 5.2 
Boris 
Ivanishvili Metalloinvest, ore 36 (0.8%) 15 (0.3%) 8.8 
Kakha 
Bendukidze 
United Machinery, 
engineering 35 (0.8%) 10 (0.2%) 0.3 
Vladimir 
Yevtushenkov 
Sistema/MTS, 
telecoms 20 (0.5%) 27 (0.5%) 2.1 
David 
Yakobashvili, 
Mikhail 
Dubinin, 
Sergei 
Plastinin 
WimmBillDann, 
dairy/juice 13 (0.3%) 20 (0.4%) 0.2 
Total  1,831 (42.4%) 2,026 (39.1%)  
 
Table 5: Russian ‘oligarchs’ and their wealth in 2003 
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Source: ‘The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism’ by Guriev and Rachinsky 
 
 
 
 
 
 Employment Annual Sales 
Oligarchs 42% 39% 
Other private domestic 22% 13% 
Foreign owners 3% 8% 
Regional governments 6% 6% 
Russian federal 
government 15% 26% 
No data 12% 8% 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of the Sample by Ownership Categories 
 
Source: Guriev, Sergei; Rachinsky, Andrei; Journal of Economic Perspectives; The Role 
of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism 
 
 
Sector Sales 2001, 
billions of rubles 
Oligarchs’ share 
in sales 
Four-firm 
concentration 
ratio 
Oil 1,256 72% 59% 
Natural gas 579 1% 94% 
Energy 499 8% 49% 
Ferrous metals 275 78% 66% 
Automotive 225 71% 71% 
Machinery 209 12% 12% 
Nonferrous metals 
(except aluminum) 154 92% 95% 
Milk 100 18% 23% 
Pulp and paper 93 30% 41% 
Coal 89 48% 47% 
Aluminum 84 80% 90% 
Construction materials 82 6% 32% 
Jewelry 74 0% 87% 
Meat 69 16% 29% 
Fertilizers 61 46% 66% 
Beer 59 2% 57% 
Tobacco 59 0% 91% 
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Bakery  58 0% 5% 
Rubber 51 4% 65% 
Confectionary 50 0% 59% 
Timber 48 5% 8% 
Vodka 45 14% 33% 
Fish 42 0% 22% 
Mill 40 5% 14% 
Pipes 34 55% 85% 
Ore 30 73% 59% 
Tyre 28 10% 64% 
Pharmaceutical  28 17% 37% 
Cable 23 15% 34% 
Poligraphy 22 2% 38% 
Furniture 20 3% 23% 
Nonalcoholic drinks 18 0% 62% 
Total 4,500 39%  
 
Table 7: Oligarchs’ Control and Ownership Concentration by Sectors 
 
Source: Guriev, Sergei; Rachinsky, Andrei; Journal of Economic Perspectives; The Role 
of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism 
 
Insider ownership and lack of outsider institutional ownership concentration is a 
result of the vague and weak legal environment in the first years of Russian mass 
privatization. As I have mentioned earlier in the paper, the ‘Fathers of Russian 
privatization’ have envisioned that voucher privatization could have been the basis for 
institutional ownership, but investment funds lacked liquidity, access to company 
registers, and an enforcement mechanism that would guarantee their ownership due to 
privatization plan ‘Option Two’ of voucher privatization. Russian investment funds have 
also lacked professionalism and competence. Many investment funds have also proved to 
be fraudulent, which resulted in a lack of trust in these funds by Russian private 
investors.  
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5.3 Entrenchment 
 
 Management teams in Russian firms have usually been associated with each other 
for a long time and that is why the firms where the ownership shares are concentrated in 
the hands of a few, are called ‘comradeship’ or ‘companionship’ firms. In addition, 
‘comrades’ never stop looking for ways to enhance their ownership stakes (Guriev & 
Rachinsky, 2005). 
Countless fraudulent and criminal activities by managers, with respect to 
obtaining shareholder wealth in Russian companies have become regular practices, 
disguised in many ways. The most commonly used method of capital concentration by 
management teams was acquiring vouchers held by workers who owned the majority of 
company shares. Workers in Russia collectively appeared to be passive; they did not 
perceive their interests to be aligned with the value of the company, but rather with the 
job security (Boycko et al., 1993). In many cases workers gave shares to managers for 
nothing more than a promise that they would not get fired. In more ill-mannered cases, 
managers secretly acquired shares without workers’ knowledge through ‘pocket 
companies’. More commonly, when workers wanted to sell their stock, managers came 
out to be the only buyers since shares were not liquid and securities markets 
underdeveloped. In other cases, insiders (managers and workers) colluded together in 
opposition to outsiders, generally by workers’ voting support to keep insider control over 
privatized enterprises (Mickiewicz, 2006). Still other times, managers would get loans 
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from the company to supplement their stakes, which led to higher ownership than they 
got in the ‘closed subscription’ of privatization plan ‘Option Two’ (Boycko et al, 1993).  
  Entrenchment seemed to be the key attitude of managers towards obtaining the 
majority of shares during Russian privatization. Managerial strategy was aimed at 
preserving their control of the company: some managers kept share registers locked up in 
their offices, they kept more than one registry, at times managers refused to register 
shares, they frequently changed registration from common to preferred stock, which 
resulted in loss of voting shares for certain shareholders. Other tools used by managers to 
keep outsiders away from being able to attend shareholder meetings included summoning 
to meetings at a very short notice or mailing out notifications ex post (Kuznetsov & 
Kuznetsova, 1996). In an attempt to dissolve this problem, the Russian Duma adopted the 
Law on Stock Companies and the Law on the Securities Market in 1995 alongside the 
establishment of National Registry Company in 1995, but that was already much too late, 
since managers by then had seized over the 51% of equity in most firms. Still, in order to 
sell their shares, shareholders had to go through management and in many cases 
managers threatened to fire workers in order to prevent them from selling their shares to 
outsiders (Lavelle, 2004). 
5.4 Agency Problem 
 
Russian corporate ownership structure is heavily concentrated, as 50-60% of the 
dominant owners hold all or most of the company equity alone, which is the reason why 
there is skepticism and lack of outside investors (Mickiewicz, 2006). Russian agency 
problems did not occur with a large block shareholder - manager’s failure to satisfy the 
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objectives of diffused shareholders, but with the crowding-out and expropriation of 
minority shareholders. The role of the dominant owner and manager became united in 
Russian companies and it was also typical for the stake of dominant owners to continue 
growing. Opportunistic managers with large blocks of shares did not pursue the same 
interests as outsider shareholders who are interested in creating firm value in the long-
run. Instead concentrated ownership in companies facilitated managerial strategies in 
value skimming transfers at the expense of minority shareholders, they put themselves in 
the position where they accumulated substantial amounts of wealth from loss-making 
enterprises. The interest of managers thus shifted from obtaining great stakes of 
ownership to draining resources of the firm. Dominant strategies of corporate governance 
abuses were:  
o share dilution; 
o asset-stripping through transfer-pricing;  
o non-transparent ownership structures; 
o use of bankruptcy as a take-over instrument, spinning-off ‘daughter companies’ in 
ownership of a smallcircle of managers. The ‘mother enterprise’ takes the losses, 
accumulates debt, delays wages and payments, holds back taxes – while profits go 
to the managers´ pockets (Gustafson, 1999); 
o cash-flow diversion through creation of a number of small affiliated firms, which 
are put in place to ‘control’ the cash flow of the firm. Managers used these small 
firms then to transfer money into their personal accounts (Mickiewicz, 2006).  
From the actions taken by the managers who obtained great ownership stakes in 
their companies we can see they were not interested in the long-term strategy of their 
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companies; the only strategy that these managers had, was to get rich quick. General 
instability of the Russian system regarding property rights, inheritance rights, contract 
law, judicial protection, and personal safety made managers channel the assets out of the 
company even faster (Mickiewicz, 2006). If they did not steal from the company now, 
somebody else would the next day; therefore the standard problem of corporate 
governance in Russia is not the conflict between managers and owners, but a conflict 
between different owners. The size of holdings in Russia gives no  
immunity against raiders. The same institutional weaknesses that made it possible for the 
managers to obtain great ownership stakes has made these managers insecure about the 
future value of their investments. The weak, almost chaotic legal environment in Russia 
was therefore an ideal place for managerial predators to seize enormous amounts of 
wealth in state owned firms. At this point, the question is: “At whose expense did these 
large block shareholders get so rich?”  
Weak legal protection of minority shareholders was the exact reason why 
managers could engage in such value–destroying actions. Russia is an example of a 
country where improvement in the legal structure of minority shareholder protection is 
crucial to prevent their expropriation. Corporate governance has a powerful effect on 
market value in a country where legal and cultural constraints on corporate behavior are 
weak. In January 2001, the Law on Joint-Stock Companies was enforced to solve the 
issue of minority shareholder abuse by the managerial apparatus.  
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Law on Joint-
Stock Companies 
(JSC) 
Enforced on August 7 2001, 
Article 7: Rights issues are 
permitted as long as they do 
not violate the internal 
regulations of the company 
or the amendments to the 
JSC 
The amendments to the law are 
designed to strengthen the protection 
of minority shareholders. Amendment 
to the JSC on February 24 2004 
specifies that cumulative voting must 
be used in the election of board 
members for joint-stock companies 
with any number of stockholders. 
There must be a minimum of five 
board members. 
 
Table 8: Law on Joint-Stock Companies 
 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Financial Report – Russia 
 
Still, Russia is also an example of a country where managers have well-integrated 
political links and prevent legal reforms that would enhance minority rights from seeing 
the light of day. In ‘Corporate Governance and Finance in Poland and Russia’, Tomasz 
Mickiewicz states that:  
“Deliberately inadequate legislative framework in Russia may also be a result of 
rent-seeking behavior of politicians who have strong formal and informal relations with 
powerful shareholders. Consequentially arrangements regarding corporate governance 
were not the product of an evolutionary process prioritizing efficiency, but rather the 
implementation of a certain political agenda”. (Mickiewicz, 173)  
 
5.5 The Root of Problems with the Corporate Governance in Russia 
 
 Russian securities law is based on the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate governance 
structure. However, the actual system of corporate control is far away from the Anglo-
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American system where minority shareholders are well-protected and the owners do not 
diversify their holdings as soon as the opportunity arises (Mickiewicz, 2006). 
Russian example of high ownership concentration and insider ownership has 
proven to destroy value in corporations and affect performance negatively. The role of 
corporate governance is to create trust between the people who run the company and 
investors; the case with Russian corporate governance seems to completely undermine its 
most essential task. The major concern, regarding corporate governance in Russia, is to 
protect shareholders’ rights and enforce laws designed to control equity expropriation of 
opportunistic managers.  
Various domestic and international institutions – private and public – have been 
actively involved with the process of corporate governance reconstruction in Russia. In 
2000, OECD and the World Bank have put pressure on Russian government to promote 
the principles of good corporate governance developed by OECD and in 2002 the 
Russian Federal Securities and Exchange Commission introduced the voluntary Code of 
Corporate Behavior (CCB) (Mickiewicz, 2006). Companies in Russia mostly take no 
notice of the Code of Corporate Behavior, but the companies that comply with the CCB 
are usually the ones that seek to attract financial resources from the international markets. 
The companies that try to attract foreign capital not only comply with CCB, but also with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), depending on which financial markets they are focused. Unfortunately 
there is still wide discrepancy between the standards of good corporate governance and 
the actual practices (Mickiewicz, 2006).  
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5.6 Economic Crime 
 
 There are three macroeconomic components that dictate market operations in the 
Russian economy, which are: the state, enterprises, and organized crime. Organized 
crime, more commonly known as the ‘mafia’, is a multi-interconnected predatory social 
order in the economy that feeds on criminal activities in the society. Gustafson defines 
economic crime in his book ‘Capitalism Russian-Style’ as: 
 “A catch-all category used in Russian law enforcement statistics to cover an 
assortment of crimes against property, ranging from theft, embezzling, and fraud to 
counterfeiting, falsifying documents and contracts, and concealing income”. (Gustafson 
137) 
 
 According to statistics provided by the Russian Presidential Report in 2002, the 
mafia collects ‘protection’ money from 80% of all Russian private enterprises and 
commercial banks in the proportion of 15% - 20% of their turnover or 50% of their 
profits to ensure ‘special relations’ with representatives of authorities. It is said that in 
Russia ‘protection’ comes with a rental lease (Gustafson, 1999). Organized crime can 
have such a big share of economic output, because the state has been lagging behind in 
the following three aspects of order: 
o the state has not provided basic law and order as far as protecting of citizens’ 
lives, property rights, and contract enforcement goes; 
o the state has not developed legal framework in accordance with establishing clear 
distinctions between legal and illegal actions; 
o the powers that the state retains have more often negative than positive effects on 
the macroeconomy, consisting of efforts such as the creation of new regulatory 
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structures, such as foreign-trade controls that become new opportunities for 
bureaucrats to claim turf and levy tribute (Gustafson, 1999). 
The missing frameworks of order in a laissez-faire market economy, mentioned 
above, have much to do also with the scale and scope of the initial privatization and thus 
provide a breeding ground for corrupt practices. In the emerging economy with lack of 
institutions at its place and not enough enforcement officers, market participants design 
their own unwritten rules. The state’s main direct weakness for its inability to impose 
stricter order, besides ineffectiveness of contract enforcement, is lack of money coming 
in from the tax payers. Therefore, the state is not able to raise the low level of salaries 
paid to the police officers, the customs officials, and the tax collectors who are under-
trained and under-armed.  
The negative effects that the economic crime has on the Russian economy are the 
following: 
o Inflationary: Organized crime puts pressure on prices of goods and services 
because transactions that form its existence are based solely on cash, operate in 
the black economy and have access to foreign currency that the Russian central 
bank does not have an access to. Cash business and forgery of money thus amount 
to uncontrolled emission of money in the system. In addition, businesses which 
are financially extorted by organized crime simply pass their increasing costs on 
to the customers. The level of inflation in the country consequently increases.   
o Distributional: Crime takes away from public goods and increases private ones, 
mainly by reduction of tax receipts; 
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o Capital flight and ‘Dollarization’: Investors, businessmen, criminals, and ordinary 
people are looking for safe heavens abroad due to the weak ruble, increasing 
inflation, and ineffective of legal framework. People rather than put their money 
in banks, exchange it for dollars and keep cash under the mattress.  
o Inefficient economy: Extortion is very hard to fight in Russia, because everyone 
has something to hide – victims do not report extortions to the authorities because 
either they are part of criminal cartels or they fear of revealing their incomes to 
the tax inspectors. Extortion thus leads to double taxation and adds to the costs. 
o Crime creates distrust among people: Fear of being cheated or extorted creates a 
downward spiral, powered by perception to always expect the worst. Banks have 
tightened up their commercial loans due to the priority of companies in Russia 
being an increase of managers’ salaries as opposed to paying off their debts, 
which consequentially has tended to undermine lenders’ confidence (Gustafson, 
1999). 
5.7 Transparency Issues 
 
 The Russian Accounting Standard (RAS) is the official accounting standard for 
financial reporting in the country, which was originally designed for a centrally planned 
economy and is unsuited for the market economy. There is great pressure from foreign 
investors on Russian companies to adopt and implement the International Financial 
Reporting System (IFRS) and International Auditing Standards (IAS), which are the 
standards that Russian companies issuing equity on foreign stock exchanges need to 
accommodate.  
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However, RAS is still widely used all over Russia mainly because it gives 
managers the incentives to under-or over-report companies’ profits. The consequence of 
inadequate financial reporting leads to abuse of minority shareholders through wasted 
assets and inability of investors to make adequate decisions based on inaccurate financial 
information about companies. The culture of under-and over-reporting in Russia is 
widespread due to managerial incentives such as tax evasion strategy and capital flight. I 
will look at issues such as tax evasion and capital flight more closely later on in this 
paper, particularly as I will describe fiscal circumstances in Russia.   
Disclosure is a new concept to Russian culture of doing business and it will take 
some time before the businesses will learn how to deal with it. Pressure is exerted on 
Russian companies from the international investment community; an OECD study found 
that the flow of capital is increased to the firms with high transparency, low corruption, 
and an efficient judicial system. Companies of the ‘emerging market economies’, 
including Russia, tend to have low disclosure of financial reports, which as a result of 
inadequate enforcement contributes to attracting less foreign capital than their potential. 
To keep bringing foreign capital in and adjust to the ‘western way’ of doing business, 
Russian authorities have sped up the process by inviting the largest accounting firms, 
various international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, the US Agency for 
International Development, and TACIS to help Russian companies understand the 
meaning of disclosure (Mickiewicz, 2006).  
According to the survey conducted by S&P which measured and compared the 54 
largest companies in Russia with the top-10 companies listed in the 2006 Fortune 500, it 
took an average of 136.6 days after year-end to issue financial statements in Russia, 
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comparing to an average of 63.3 days in the US (Mickiewicz, 2006). Information is more 
accurate and available for larger companies and there is some evidence suggesting that it 
takes more time to report bad news than good news.  
 
Rank Country Score 
1 Finland 17 
1 Belgium 17 
1 Germany 17 
4 USA 20 
4 Chile 20 
4 Thailand 20 
9 Japan 22 
11 Switzerland 25 
15 Argentina 30 
20 Hong Kong 33 
31 Ireland 38 
33 Russia 40 
38 Czech Republic 44 
41 Spain 50 
 
Table 9: Accounting and governance practices in selected countries  
 
Source: Mickiewicz, Tomasz; Corporate Governance and Finance in Poland and Russia; 
Kurtzman et al. (2004) 
 
 
Lastly, the question is how much of ‘lack of transparency’ is actually ‘required’ 
by the Kremlin rules. President Putin likes to have tight control of enterprises in Russia’s 
strategic industries and transparency advocated by international democratic institutions 
does not go along well with the instructions these companies receive from Kremlin.   
The Rise of Putin  
Mr. Putin was elected President in March 2000 and easily re-elected in 2004. 
President Putin’s rapid rise to the premiership from serving as the head of FSB (Federal 
Security Service, formerly the KGB) and President Yeltsin’s Prime Minister has been 
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mostly the product of President Yeltsin’s political support. In President Yeltsin’s eyes, 
Putin could either become a very dangerous enemy or a powerful friend through his 
extensive knowledge he gained in the intelligence services he has been involved with 
throughout most of his life – President Yeltsin’s main concern was his own and his 
business friends’ protection from investigation and prosecution by the state, which could 
potentially be triggered by Mr. Putin if his political ambitions would not be satisfied.  
 
Yukos is an example that demonstrates the mission of Kremlin that advocates lack 
of accounting transparency, fears of transformation of economic into political power, and 
could be described by a slogan ‘mysticism = good, transparency = bad’.  
 
 
The Tale of Yukos 
Yukos was a major Russian non-state oil company that produced about 2% of 
world’s oil production. The company was acquired by Mikhail Khodorkhovsky through 
the controversial ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme. Yukos went through the transformation from 
the company with abusive corporate governance to Russia’s most respected company, 
serving as an example of good corporate governance and transparency. The company has 
pioneered shipping Russian oil to the U.S. market and it was also known as the ‘Russian 
company most independent from the government’.  
Dismantlement of Yukos was initially stimulated by Mikhail Khodorkhovsky’s 
political power aspirations, especially through his financial support of the opposition 
political parties and his desire to run for president in the 2008 presidential elections. Soon 
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enough Yukos was charged with tax evasion of US$7 billion, followed by past charges of 
irregularities against Yukos’s shareholders. 
 Yukos’s ‘fall from grace’ began with Mikhail Khodorkhovsky’s arrest due to his 
anti-United Russia political aspirations, late in 2003. Three years after the company’s 
former CEO’s arrest, a Russian court declared Yukos bankrupt. The attack on Yukos by 
the Russian government severely damaged the Russian stock market, causing the RTS 
index to fall by over 20% and triggering immense capital flight.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Yukos stock price 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
Highly transparent enterprises are very difficult for the state to control, because in 
transparent financial statements each transaction is on the surface, while mystical 
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financial statements that still dominate the financial reports of extremely profitable 
Russian companies are very handy for extortion of any kind. Transparency and sound 
corporate governance are viewed as a tool towards political independence and the Yukos 
affair demonstrates that the Kremlin elite’s biggest fear is the emergence of a powerful 
political opposition whose beginnings have been detected very early in the pro-Western, 
economically sound company.  
 
Summary 
The art of maintaining the principal rule of political supremacy in a country can well be 
transformed to preservation of the executive supremacy in an enterprise, where if 
interrelated, the latter serves the former. Fight for a territory is a constant battle and to 
satisfy the components of longevity of time and size of a terrain for as long as possible, 
the governing body has to prevent the opposition from springing up at the early stage. We 
discover that the liberalization of capital markets in Russia was just a tool in the hands of 
the political elite that wanted to keep the privileges of the greatest authority on the 
Russian soil. History tells us that the new class of economic lords or the ‘power 
preserving agents’ was a group of wise, law-breaking, and very well connected 
individuals. The class of newborn ‘oligarchs’ in Russia became the ruling minority that 
was not interested in creating value; rather they were interested in stealing the value that 
has already existed. Hence, the institution of corporate governance in Russian companies 
does not rise up to the expectations of Western standards. 
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6. Russian Financial Crisis of 1998 
 
A timeline of Russian currency crisis (Chiodo & Owyang, 10) 
 
April 1996 Negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs for repayment of Soviet 
debt begin. 
1997  Trade surplus moving toward balance. 
  Inflation around 11%. 
  Oil selling at $23/barrel. 
  Analyst predict better credit ratings for Russia. 
  Russian banks increase foreign liabilities. 
  Real wages sagging. 
  Only 40% of workforce being paid fully and on time. 
  Public-sector deficit high. 
October 1997  Negotiations with Paris and London Clubs completed. 
November 11, 1997 Asian crisis causes a speculative attack on the ruble. 
  CBR defends the ruble, losing $6 billion. 
December 1997  Year ends with 0.8% growth. 
  Prices of oil and nonferrous metal begin to drop. 
February 1998  IMF funds requested. 
March 1998  Continued requests for IMF funds. 
April 1998  Another speculative attack on the ruble. 
Early May 1998 Dubinin warns government ministers of impending debt crisis, with 
reporters in the audience. 
May 19, 1998 CBR increases lending rate from 30% to 50% and defends the ruble with 
$1 billion. 
Mid May 1998 Oil prices continue to decrease. 
 Oil and gas oligarchs advocate devaluation of ruble to increase value of 
their exports. 
May 23, 1998 IMF leaves Russia without agreement on austerity plan. 
May 27, 1998 CBR increases the lending rate again to 150%. 
Summer 1998 Russian government formulates and advertises anti-crisis plan. 
July 13, 1998 An emergency $22.6 billion international package is announced. 
 The GKO-Eurobond swap is announced; GKO yields halve. 
August 13, 1998 Russian stock, bond, and currency markets weaken as a result of investor 
fears of devaluation; prices diminish. 
August 17, 1998 Russian government devalues the ruble, defaults on domestic debt, and 
declares a moratorium on payment to foreign creditors. 
September 2, 1998 The ruble is floated after $2.8 billion in reserves is lost between August 
17 and September 2. 
October 30, 1998 The IMF mission leaves, with large unresolved differences on the budget 
as well as on the action plan to address the crisis. 
December 1998 Year ends with a decrease in real output of 4.9%. 
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 Throughout the years of rapid privatization in Russia (1992 – 1996), the GDP was 
steadily decreasing, whereas foreign debt has been growing. Russia inherited a great sum 
of foreign debt from the Soviet Union and the officials began negotiating the 
postponement of sovereign debt in 1996. In 1997, Russia joined the Paris Club of creditor 
nations after rescheduling the payment of over $60 billion to other governments. Russia 
also negotiated a 23-year debt repayment of $33 billion with the London Club (Chiodo & 
Owyang, 2002). 
In addition to mounting sovereign debt, Russia did not generate any additional 
funds from its ‘express privatization’. Russian policymakers were in favor of ‘freeing up 
the markets’ rapidly instead of taking a gradual approach. Market fundamentalist policies 
that the reformers implemented echoed the conviction of IMF’s economists’ beliefs about 
free markets allowing more efficiency for faster growth. The enthusiasm of prosperous 
growth that the market-based economy promises, and impatience to get there, have 
undermined negative effects of rapid policy implementations, or in Russia’s case an 
economic ‘shock therapy’.  
 Market economy transition turmoil began right after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, when in 1992 Russian authorities postponed stabilization, de-monopolization and 
privatization until after the price liberalization action. The prices were freed-up 
overnight, except on a small selection of goods that were kept artificially low, oil being 
one of them. The first consequence was an increase in prices due to the demand pressure 
(‘ruble overhang’) and inflation that was previously suppressed through artificial 
determination of prices in the economy (Feidge, 1994). Price liberalization caused hyper-
inflation, which put macro stability on very shaky grounds and in addition wiped out all 
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the savings. Next, interest rates were raised in response to high inflation; in effect this 
action caused general distrust in the economic health of the country. Due to the increase 
in interest rates, (1) Russian debt increased, which then scared investors, fearing that 
Russia would devalue in order to finance its non-denominated debt and (2) at the same 
time high government debt made it impossible for firms to obtain new capital. Hence, the 
most notable response of economic agents that followed the economic turbulence was the 
rush of money out of the country, which was not an option before the capital markets 
were liberalized. ‘Capital flight’ was noted in a form of (1) ‘hot money’ being sucked 
back into the hands of foreign investors or in (2) transactions of large sums being placed 
on the bank accounts owned by Russians in Cyprus or Switzerland. ‘Capital flight’ was a 
maneuver that brought Russia financially on its knees. As we can see the process of 
liberalization and massive privatization was not a wealth generating progression, rather a 
contest of ‘asset stripping’ since nobody wanted to have their funds in such an 
economically volatile country. 
The country in the early nineties was extremely rich with natural resources, 
generating revenue from exporting oil, therefore relying heavily on the global price of oil, 
but economically very unstable, with great sovereign debt, without the ability to provide 
pensions for the elderly, without the ability to cover the welfare payments for the poor, 
without a disciplined taxpayer base, without proper institutions in place, without a sound 
strategy towards the development of markets. In the words of Joseph Stiglitz: 
 “They tried to take a shortcut to capitalism, creating a market economy without 
the underlying institutions, and institutions without the underlying institutional 
infrastructure. New firms need to be able to raise new capital, and this requires banks that 
are real banks – a real and effective banking system requires strong banking regulations. 
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New firms need to be able to acquire land, and this requires a land market and land 
registration”. (Stiglitz, 139)  
 
Russian officials were counting on 2% GDP growth in 1998; they decreased 
domestic borrowing, and increased tax collection to meet the interest payments. Next 
came a disastrous time for Russia, as the ruble came under speculative attack after the 
‘Asian Crisis’ in late 1997, global prices of nonferrous metal and oil began to drop and 
the GDP in 1998 declined by 4.9%. Early in 1998, Russian stock (the RTS index fell in 
January for 20%, in July for 40%, and additional 30% in August of 1998), bond, and 
currency markets collapsed due to foreign investor fears of ruble devaluation and default 
on sovereign debt (Chiodo & Owyang, 2002). 
After the global oil prices dropped, the ruble became very unstable, and until the 
last breath the Russian Central Bank kept borrowing dollars and pouring them on their 
economy (by the advice of IMF, since the dollar rates at the time were much lower than 
the ruble rates, the total amount of rescue package from the IMF, World Bank, and 
Japanese government totaled to $22.6 billion) thus artificially keeping the ruble ‘sound’ 
(Stiglitz, 2002). By June, the interest rates on ruble loans (GKOs – the Russian equivalent 
to US T-Bills) got to 60%, and went up even higher to 150% in a matter of weeks – 
depleting the foreign reserves (Stiglitz, 2002).  
 
Key Features of Russia’s July 1998 Emergency Financing Package (Kharas, Pinto & 
Ulatov, 10-11) 
 
o $22.6 billion in funding ($15.1 billion from the IMF, $6.0 from the World Bank, 
and $1.5 billion from the Government of Japan), of which $14.8 billion was to be 
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received during the second half of 1998 and $7.8 billion during 1999 upon 
completion of fiscal and structural reforms. A total of $5.5 billion was actually 
disbursed: $4.8 billion by the IMF, $0.3 billion by the World Bank, and $0.4 
billion by the Government of Japan. These turned out to be the only 
disbursements under the auspices of the July 1998 package. 
 
o Fiscal reforms to achieve a primary surplus at the federal government level for 
1999 of 3% of GDP; fiscal targets for 1998 were left unchanged. 
 
o Structural reforms to deal with non payments, enhancing competition, 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, the financial sector, and infrastructure 
monopolies – in other words, comprehensive reforms to harden enterprise 
budgets, ensure long-run fiscal sustainability, and create a good climate for 
private sector development and investment. 
 
o A market-based debt swap designed to convert GKOs into long-term dollar-
denominated Eurobonds (the GKO-Eurobond swap). This was designed to 
supplement efforts to move away from domestic debt financing by issuing 
Eurobonds instead, beginning in early June. Although not formally a part of the 
package, the swap was seen by the market as an integral component of the overall 
financing and restructuring effort. 
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The economic conditions of extremely large deficits and low foreign reserves led 
the government of Russian Federation and the Russian Central Bank to float the 
exchange rate, default on its sovereign debt, devalue the ruble, and announce moratorium 
by commercial banks on foreign credit on August 17, 1998.   
 The Russian currency crisis was triggered by failed hopes for sustained economic 
growth, and time-consuming reforms to correct fiscal fundamentals in order to decrease 
fiscal deficits, which led to rapidly growing public debt (with predominance of high-
yielding GKOs). In addition Russian policy-makers had to deal with market signals 
perceived by investors (contagion effects from Asian crisis in combination with a decline 
in gas and oil prices) of exceptionally high levels of default and devaluation risk. (Kharas 
et.al, 2001) 
 
Summary 
The Russian financial crisis of 1998 is an example of inconsistent polices – high fiscal 
deficits, low-inflation objectives sustaining a fixed exchange rate. The Russian financial 
crisis has not only been the product of a toxic mix of policies, but more importantly it 
delayed the institutional reforms necessary for long-term economic prosperity.  The by-
products of such inefficiencies in the capital market liberalization model are ruthless asset 
stripping and capital flight committed by the few fortunate individuals who support the 
current political structure of the land. Without the legal infrastructure in place, ensuring 
good corporate governance, those individuals who get control of a corporation are not 
encouraged to reinvest in the country’s future; rather they watch their bank accounts 
grow in Switzerland and Cyprus. As it turns out, the 1998 bailout policy was orchestrated 
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by the Yeltsin administration and the IMF, behind which stood the Clinton administration 
whose aim was to prevent Russia from sliding back into communism.  
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7. Financial Crisis Revelations 
 
 It is a Utopian’s dream to liberalize the capital market and expect improvements 
in allocation of resources, increased capital productivity, equal distribution of wealth 
among the population, and consequentially causing stimulation of economic growth in a 
country where prior to a rapid liberalization plan the economic environment lacked 
market institutions, was absent of asset markets for valuing property, with lack of private 
savings, and in addition a political environment that was clearly inimical to market 
activities in the past. What was the purpose of capital market liberalization when the 
policy makers knew already that the necessary conditions to achieve a successful 
transition were not in place? What were the incentives of such rapid makeover policies?  
 I will present the grounds and argue why predominant aspiration for political 
power and the desire for excessive personal wealth of an existing ruling minority was 
what initially set-off the events taking place in Russia with regard to the liberalization of 
its capital market. Liberalization of capital market in Russia was a political move of 
reformist politicians, aiming to change the political balance in the country by creating a 
class of supporters and reducing the power of its political opponents. The so-called 
reformist politicians saw the market ideologies mentioned above as a way to steal and 
gain both political and economic power.   
7.1 Legislative Issues  
 
The Russian financial crisis in 1998 revealed that institutional and legislative 
reforms in the 90’s were anything else but exact. For this reason the institutional 
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governance was a serious issue in the transition towards a liberalized economy. New 
legislation was required to keep an eye on managers and to define their legal liabilities. 
During the phase of restructuring, the internal controls and creditor rights were not 
clearly defined; therefore little value could be applied to vaguely defined laws, which in 
effect gave the opportunity to managers to strip the enterprises of their assets. On the 
other hand, laws were not defined vaguely when the managers’ existence came into 
question.   
“Russian bankruptcy law was written under close supervision of the managerial 
lobby, and allows permanent ‘rehabilitation’ of bankrupt companies under existing 
management”. (Boycko et al., 164-165) 
 
Contractual agreements in Russia were also an immense obstacle to social justice 
because they had to be self-enforcing to work since the state could not enforce them, due 
to an inadequate legal framework.   
“The state has also institutionalized a legal system to protect property rights, 
decrease transaction costs, enforce contracts, and ensure competition. However, the 
Russian state has devoted few resources to developing a court system capable of 
defending investors or property owners”. (McFaul, 236) 
 
Thus in Russia, where contracts were not enforceable and bankruptcy impossible, 
commercial banks were hesitant to give out loans, since bankruptcy procedures gave 
creditors no rights to seize a borrower’s assets in case of a default on the contract. 
Nevertheless, Russian companies still borrowed heavily from the government and most 
loans were considered a form of subsidy, since they got repaid very rarely. As a 
consequence, during 1992 alone “the inter-enterprise arrears have increased from 40 
billion ruble to 3.2 trillion ruble”. (Feidge, 15) 
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The collapse of the Russian financial system has thus exposed the weakness of the 
Russian government with regards to the inability of supporting contracts and protecting 
property rights. In order to achieve economic growth, the governments have to be 
certified with a degree of power, in fact a monopoly of power to have the ability to 
protect property rights, enforce contracts, and promote the sustainability of reforms.  
7.2 Financial Market 
 
The financial crisis of 1998 revealed that long term economic progress can not be 
built on weak institutional reforms. The crisis also exposed a weak supervisory and 
prudential regulation of Russian money and capital markets, which lacked depth and 
breath. Inadequately developed financial institutions did not provide diversification of 
risks associated with productivity; they did not manage liquidity risk, and were not 
capable enough to evaluate potential projects properly (Kemme, 2001). 
The crisis also demonstrated that the failure of inefficient reforms causes 
economic stress borne by the weakest and most vulnerable financial market participants – 
the small savers. The formation of safety net for savers is the most critical part of access 
to liquidity. Targeting household’s deposits is of significant importance to formation of 
healthy financial market because confidence in the banking system can improve the 
mobilization of savings and investments, which consequentially leads to the deepening of 
the financial system. The Russian central bank did not guarantee any safety for saver’s 
deposits in commercial banks except for the savings at Sberbank, the state bank.  
How did the financial system in Russia justify the existence of commercial banks 
if their primary roles were not carried out at all? The distribution of subsidies was highly 
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politicized in the Soviet banking system in terms of final destination of state credits. The 
allocation of capital was up to the central bank to take care of and the purpose of 
commercial banks was merely to serve as financial institutions through which the central 
banks’ credits were channeled through. In the Soviet banking system, financial 
intermediation services were based upon the mechanisms of political influence which did 
not provide financial intermediation services as the banking system in the market 
economy does. The Russian banking industry was highly concentrated, which contributed 
to inefficient allocation of resources and higher intermediation costs. 
7.3 Politicization 
 
 The old-line politicians during the Soviet rule, have not been replaced and have 
continually undermined the reforms of transition. Therefore allocation of private capital 
and successful restructuring in Russia has been thwarted by political allocation of capital. 
Managers of firms will always cater to the sources of funds and until the financial crisis 
of 1998, Russian government has been a major provider of funds through subsidies. In 
1993, state subsidies accounted for 22% of Russia’s GNP with only a few market 
institutions created (McFaul, 1995). An example of political influence in the business 
sector were the so called ‘performance contracts’, which were contracts between the 
government and managers of state enterprises. These ‘performance contracts’ were set up 
to improve state enterprises by setting targets, which were not ambitious and did not 
boost an additional return on assets. However, when these lethargic targets were 
achieved, the managers and staff members were rewarded greatly for project 
implementation. As it turned out, these ‘performance contracts’ were not used to 
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stimulate the business performance of state companies, rather they were used by the 
company managers to obtain funds from the politicians. Politicians on the other hand 
subsidized enterprises in order to have a say in the strategy development and convince 
managers to pursue political objectives, which did not always go along with the lines of 
profit maximization.   
 After the financial crisis, the government had minimized soft credits and 
subsidies, but still a complete de-politicization of capital is required to make availability 
of capital on commercial terms. Bankruptcy law has to be revised, because firms that go 
bust simply seek debt relief from the government.  
7.4 Institutions 
 
Before I apply the theory of institutional development to the country of Russia, I 
would like to share some thoughts about the myth of institutions and why they support 
market order and growth. According to the ‘new institutionalist’ theory, an institution has 
to satisfy what Williamson calls the “remediableness criterion”: “…an extant mode of 
organization for which no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented 
with expected net gains…”. (Shirley, 31) Further discussion of the role of institution 
refers to institutions as the pillars of economically developed society with the power to 
establish common norms, rules, and procedures for economic agents. Economic 
institutions in particular facilitate economic activity by decreasing transaction costs, 
decrease the uncertainty of counterparties doing business together, and empower the state 
to protect private property rights rather than seize the assets from its citizens at their 
convenience. The first two sets of institutions comprise contract and contract enforcement 
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mechanisms as its most important elements. The latter constituent that an institution has 
an influence over, namely the protection of private property rights is of utmost 
importance to our discussion, because it targets constitutions, electoral rules, laws 
governing speech, also including legal and civic norms (Shirley, 2005).  
Trading and exchange is common to all men in today’s economy. According to 
Coase:  
“Transaction costs determine the evolution of institutions; the effects of high 
transaction costs are pervasive in the economy. If the costs of making an exchange are 
greater than the gains which that exchange would bring, that exchange would not take 
place. When information is costly and property rights are poorly protected, contracts 
become hard to specify and enforce and transaction costs are high. Societies with 
persistently higher transaction costs have less trade, fewer firms, less specialization, less 
investment, and lower productivity”. (Shirley, 4)  
 
Thus the institutions determine whether transaction costs are low or high. The more 
regulated and more transparent the market is, the frequency of trade will increase and it is 
up to institutions to establish universal third party rules, provide information on trading 
counterparts, enforce contracts and protect property rights. Development of sound 
institutions positively correlates with:  
“protection of property rights and enforcement, civil liberties, political rights and 
democracy, and institutions supporting cooperation, including trust, religion, and the 
extent of social clubs and associations”. (Shirley, 23) 
 
With respect to what I have described above, institutional integration in the 
marketplace is considered effective when economic conditions are equitably combined 
among the market participants without the ability of the political regime to expropriate 
them. 
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Now, institutional development in Russia took a gradual approach by letting 
market-supporting institutions develop spontaneously. The policy makers actually 
believed that until market-supporting capitalist institutions would emerge, the engines of 
newly created capitalist economy would run on old ‘socialist’ socioeconomic institutions. 
In order to lead a successful transition towards the market economy, the state had to be 
entirely autonomous relative to the ancient regime and special interest groups made up by 
authoritative managers and old-line politicians. A new set of institutions had to be 
established, because the re-modeling of old institutions distorted the path of economic 
transition towards the market economy. 
There is a view that the problems were due to the difficulties of trying to achieve 
change. The first theory that I propose is that the norms, beliefs, and rules embedded in 
the Soviet system can not be changed overnight and therefore a gradual approach 
regarding institutional change is needed. Consequentially then, Russian officials acted in 
good faith and wanted to assure the irreversibility of reforms by gradually and 
consistently replacing old institutions with new system of legal, administrative, 
commercial, social security, fiscal, and monetary institutions capable of supporting a 
market economy (Feidge, 1994).  
On the other hand, I suspect it rightful to suppose that the institutional change was 
not on the agenda of the political elite while everything in the country was already 
liberalized. Institutional change is a question of ‘path dependency’ – “those who make 
policy and design institutions have a stake in the framework they created and resist 
changes that may rob them of power or property” (Shirley, 29), meaning that ‘newly 
established’ capitalist institutions will only be put in place pro forma, but the ultimate 
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outcome is that the tendency of a past traditional practice will continue. However, there is 
no reason to give up on progress as far as institutional development in Russia goes, 
 “changes in beliefs and norms usually require a period of gradual learning. Path 
dependency and the stickiness of beliefs and norms explain why underdevelopment 
cannot be overcome by simply importing institutions that were successful in other 
countries”. (Shirley, 29) 
 
We should not forget that Russia was under the authoritarian regime for a long 
period of time, where highly centralized institutions disregarded competition, 
specialization or even industrialization. Politicians in the Soviet Union acted as ‘patrons’ 
who provided funds and thus solidified their support base. Through such aid projects the 
ruling elite expected to win the hearts of managers and voters in general. Political 
analysts believe that aid giving is the most important factor that has been slowing the 
institutional change by keeping the existing political force to ascend the throne - 
consequentially preventing political competition. Also, we need to point out that: “Where 
institutions are weak there are by definition few checks on rulers and conditionality will 
be met by passing laws without mechanisms for their enforcement” (Shirley, 34), 
consequentially we can expect state enterprises getting privatized without competition or 
competent corporate governance (Shirley, 2005). With respect to theft of private 
property, we can then assume that the state was not too weak to prevent theft of property 
rights by private actors, but rather so strong that the state itself threatened property rights 
(Shirley, 2005).  
The third option – combination of the former two is one that I shall exclude from 
further elaboration due to the fact that the policy makers would not have proceeded with 
rapid liberalization policies if they were actually concerned with intergenerational norms 
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and beliefs of its citizens demanding time to adjust to the new socioeconomic system. 
Therefore it is clear the reformist politicians did not act in good faith.   
7.5 Property Rights 
 
The analysis of institutional conditions in Russia prior to the financial crisis in 
1998 has shown that the state failed to create institutions that would support contracts and 
protect property rights. Something such as a private property was an unknown to citizens 
of the Soviet regime; the country had no institutional arrangements that govern the 
ownership, use, and disposal of property (Feidge, 1994). The foundation for 
circumstances that prevailed in Russia concerning protection of property rights is the 
mass privatization program orchestrated by president Yeltsin’s administration. His mass 
privatization program did not redistribute ownership of state property among the entire 
Russian population; rather ownership of state enterprises was concentrated in the hands 
of high ranked managers that supported the current political regime and already had the 
money. The fact that state ownership was wrapped around a cloud of legal fiction and 
property rights were vaguely defined allowed for a situation in which politically well-
connected managers did not hesitate to exploit the opportunity at hand to increase their 
wealth (Shirley, 2005).  
 Edgar L. Feidge writes that:  
“The absence of real property rights is largely responsible for the system’s 
inefficiency in production and exchange and its poor maintenance of capital stocks and 
natural resource endowments”. (Feidge, 4) 
 
Without a strong state and institutions in place that can enforce contracts, the creation of 
private property rights will continue to be altered. It is in their exclusivity and the ability 
66 
to exchange them that defines the values of a private property. Private property rights 
have failed to be created, distributed, and credibly enforced before the liberalization of 
capital market took place in Russia, therefore the privileged few who supported the 
political establishment could claim former state property as their own.  
 
Summary 
Inevitably, the grounds for failure of Russian financial markets in 1998 were rapid 
liberalization policies including poor investor protections and loosely defined private 
property laws. Concentrated ownership is a product of frail institutional protection and 
can be considered a substitute for weak protection of investors in an economic 
environment. Weak and vaguely defined laws as opposed to explicit legal foundations 
and the ability to enforce contracts at proper institutions make an enormous difference in 
development of capital markets. 
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7.5 Think outside the box 
 
 
 Could there be more to our arguments explaining why path of capital market 
liberalization in Russia has taken a detour from its initial plan of equal redistribution of 
former state-owned assets amongst its citizens?  
Thane Gustafson states in his book that:  
“Russia is economically unstable, because the present halfway economy cannot 
produce growth or generate investment. The one sector that has generated wealth in the 
last decade, the commodity-exporting industries, is spending its inheritance and not 
renewing it. No significant investment is going into education, science, environment, or 
health”. (Gustafson, 32) 
 
Russia’s high dependence on oil and gas, coupled with relatively low average 
productivity in manufacturing, complicates the realization of diversified growth and the 
effective integration into world markets. The distribution of wealth coming from the 
exports of natural resources is highly concentrated. The problem with Russian wealth 
distribution is that the majority of wealth created through revenue generating industries is 
not channeled to Russian public funds for creation of public goods; rather it is channeled 
to private entities.  
Also, ‘de novo’ companies in Russia have been substantially cut off from public 
subsidies and credits, which is hampering economic growth in the long run. Besides lack 
of subsidies and credits, the ‘new age’ entrepreneurs starting a small business in Russia 
run a gauntlet of confiscatory taxes, criminal extortion, scale credit, thin services, and 
obstructive bureaucracy. Concentrated wealth distribution, political favoritism, lack of 
investments in social infrastructure, high dependency on revenue generating oil and gas 
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exports, and obstructive bureaucracy count a great deal towards Russia being a unique 
example of a country going through the process of capital market liberalization.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
The reformers of Russian regime change did not take a gradual approach of 
adjustments toward a successful socioeconomic transition. The state failed to create 
market-supporting institutions and instead rather proceeded with an ambitious program of 
synchronized application of policy changes and the economic liberalization. Lack of 
market-supporting institutions and an underdeveloped legal system in Russia have been 
the key tools through which politically well-connected managers and politicians 
themselves seized the opportunity and established ownership of former state-owned 
enterprises. Russian privatization did not provide efficiency incentives to produce new 
wealth, rather is has redistributed the already existing wealth through dubious methods.  
Clearly, the ultimate goal of capital liberalization in Russia was not to disperse 
ownership of former state-owned enterprises among the people of Russia, but to create a 
powerful support group that would ensure the second mandate of President Yeltsin’s 
administration. The class of newborn ‘oligarchs’ in Russia became the ruling minority 
that was not interested in creating value; rather, they were interested in stealing the value 
that has already existed. Weak and vaguely defined laws as opposed to explicit legal 
foundations and the ability to enforce contracts at proper institutions make an enormous 
difference in development of capital markets. 
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